The Proliferation Crisis in Iran: A Failure of Global Governance

Events of Globalization Week Spring 2006

Date: Monday, April 3, 2006
Time: 6:00-8:00 PM
Location: Lindner Commons, Room 602, 1957 E Street, NW

Speakers

  • Leon Fuerth, Research Professor of International Affairs, The George Washington University, and former National Security Advisor to Vice-President Al Gore
  • Amb. Touqir Hussain, Ambassador of Pakistan to Brazil, Spain, and Japan from 1990-2003
  • Andrew Koch, Policy Planning Staff for arms control and non-proliferation, U.S. Department of State
  • Dr. Edward J. Lacey, Senior Vice President for Defense and Homeland Security, Scribe Strategies & Advisors

Overview

This event was held under the Enosinian Society's “Lindner Rule” of non-attribution, in order to grant speakers freedom to speak frankly in an off-the-record environment. As such, GWCSG cannot disclose in great detail “who said what” at the panel.

The broad questions put to the panelists were as follows: Is Iran pursuing nuclear weapons? Given current pressures, how likely is it that they will actually acquire them? What does the current crisis with Iran say about the international non-proliferation regime? What is to be done?

Combined, the four panelists provided the audience with a broad but nuanced understanding of the issues. The political and diplomatic history of Iran's movements toward uranium enrichment, as well as the friction with the International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations Security Council, and the major European powers, were detailed from both U.S. and non-U.S. perspectives. More than one panelist cited nuclear proliferation on the Indian subcontinent as the development that made Iran's nuclear strategy political possible. Once nuclear armament became a political possibility, only technological and industrial barriers stood in the way. Globalization, especially in the form of illicit weapons trafficking networks such as those of A.Q. Khan, has gone a long way toward removing the technical and industrial barriers. While all panelists acknowledge that the Iran question is a difficult one, and that none of the available responses are without their problems, some were more optimistic than others. Some thought that the non-proliferation regime as it stands is working; others argued that the regime needs new institutions and better enforcement mechanisms; still others suggested that no obvious modifications to the non-proliferation regime would be efficacious in the present situation—rather, resolution depends on the reasonableness of the parties involved, and their ability to agree on an outcome short of military conflict.

After their presentations, the panel took questions from the audience. Among those addressed were the wisdom of the recent nuclear deal between India and the United States, the best- and worst-case endgame scenarios in Iran, the need for nuclear disarmament by the extant nuclear powers, and various questions of clarification.