Antidumping duties are the most common, and most controversial form of import protection under the WTO system. Japan and many developing countries have long argued that these procedures, directed at foreign firms that sell below production cost or below home market price, are biased against their exports. Developed countries, especially, the US and EU nations, claim that antidumping duties help provide essential political backing for continued globalization. Indeed, under the Clinton administration, the US steadfastly refused even to consider including antidumping (AD) on the trade negotiating agenda. Developing countries, perhaps in retaliation, have begun to use these WTO-consistent duties on US, EU and even other developing country exports.
This author has written elsewhere that AD procedures are unlikely to be reformed in any future trade negotiations for two reasons. First, the US will half-heartedly implement reforms negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Second, the burgeoning use of AD in developing countries reflects both the growth of a new AD constituency and replacement of old barriers with a new WTO-consistent means of protection.
The proposed research will evaluate these arguments by examining aspects of the AD regime in the US and a select group of developing countries. If we find that US reform has been contrary to the spirit of Uruguay Round commitments and developed countries have simply used AD duties to replace recently-removed tariffs, then unreformed AD regime will remain an essential part of the WTO system.
Michael O. Moore (PI), Associate Professor, Department of Economics
Globalization and Trade
Globalization Brown Bag, February 2002
Commerce Department Antidumping Sunset Reviews: A Major Disappointment
Occasional Paper, CSGOP-02-01
An Econometric Analysis of US Antidumping Sunset Review Decisions
Occasional Paper, CSGOP-02-06